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Th~ Community 1$ ~t prw~~nt fle~d ~ith ~ ~ud~~t~ry $1tu~ti~n ~hi~h e~n
only brr; t"~1"11H.:t(i;lrh~d $i$ being en th~ bri.nk of blilnkruptey. rhw
unfolding of thi$ $;tu~tion ~hould come ~~ no aurprise to th~ Communlty
IS it has dev~lop~d 9r~du~tly in the course of s~verll ye~r$, and it
!'In been  innc)I..Il'Iced with ;ncr~~$in~ disQuiet by the Comminion dl.lrin~
thi$ period. ih~ background is, of tOl.lrs~, comple~p but ~ome
fundamt~t~l flctors m~y be distinguish0d 
.. Fir~t of ~ll~ th~ tommurrity h~$ fIIunk 1nto IiI moran of budg~Ury
m!lpr~ct1cu ne4l!ded to tOl'lceliJl  Ot  postpone the realt fintlll'lI::;ll
1mpUeit'lon$ of Comml.ll'l.'ity  polic'llf:$. 'fhu$$ th~ budgetary i!fIffect of th~
Ynpr~c~denhd buHd up of 4!lgr1cultural SJtock$ h~s be~n disguised by
gross owH""'v~l\,!lBt;on of the $to(;k$; C114::tulJil budgetary deficits hii!\!(~
been carried forwlJrd ~nd only covered beliUdly by eJd hoc solutions;
~nd Comml.lrdty commitments have been allowed to iccYmulate without
prop~r f;ninC;&l prov'i5;on5;
Secondly.. th~ own resources system itself has proved increasingly
'inadequ&1Ite. the resource tllJlse is gradually being eroded IiJS IJI
consequenc~ 01 other poLicies in the Community, the decline in th~
proportion of .GNP 8cc.ounted for by consumption.. inducing theg~n~r~l
trend in econom;c ~rowth away from consuMption, I!Il"Id th~ compo~h1on
of th~ base h~1)I not proved utishetory in th~ l iSM: of ComflllJnity
dli!!v~Lopml!!rrl;$, noUbLy the enl.t\!rgement to include Member StClites !IJ~U
below the Community IJIv~rag~ income.
'" Thirdly, the Community h~s not been equipped with the necessary !Vitillns
to adept poticie5 to the desired e~pend1ture scenarios. The bud~etaty
m~n~gtm~nt aspect of Community poLicies has either be'FI tot~Lly
suptessed by the rigidity of the rules - as in the ease of
mgriculture - or been ill"ed~pted to the requirements of the
s1tu~t10n, ~~ ;1"'1 th~ case of structur~t poticie~*
Th~ eomb;n~d ruul t of these factOl"1JI tin been that the Cofllmunity has
~j(c'H:t.rud iu own policy dechions without eufficient finenchl
coverage. Thus the 1. 4 % VAT was spent the year b~fore th~ new ceiling
entered into force. For 1981 the true VAT rete will be 1.65 % and not
the 1.4 % allowed for.
This situiJltion must necesuf1ly be resolved by aUow;n9 the Community
to command resources sufficient to covel" iti policies. But the
situation eil"'l only be fully rectified through profound changes 11"1 the
Community s policies Gflnd greatly improved management prlu::t1ees
II. TIlE DEVElOPMNT OF THE BUDGET IN RECENT YeARS
1. Milfl.lnctiona of the Own Resources System.
A$ froM the introduction  o'f  own resources in the Community, the
explicitly suted obj(gct1vlI1 hll Deren '&h~t these c.wn reSOl.lrees should
provide 'fulL ~nd prop~r finln~e f~r th~ e~penditure which flowed from- 3 
...
the poLicies adopted by the Community. Therefore, both at the time of
thE! Decision on Own -Ruoyrcn in 1910 IiInd at tht f'.evhion of the
Decision ;1"1 1985, when the m~~imum VAT rate W~S increa~ed from 1. 0 % to
4 %, the ctilHing was liIet lilt a Level which w~s intended to be
luffic1ent for I number of years.
'fhh intElntion of 'Icuring finaru::il/,lL stability in order to concentrG;!lte
on pol icy dtchions in the Coll'lml.mity hat not been clJlrried out 
pr~ct i ee. Nor does the present syStem of own resources i hili! U re~ond
to thfS developments in the Community l3inclII the f.J)fstem W~i &!dopted.
As  me~n$ of providing proper finluH::e for actual Community
E!xpendi'l:ure, th(ll present 1B)'ltem of own rt$OYI"C~~ luHerlil from major
def1c1enei~i - ~hich ~re ~u1tt distinct from Iny financing need arising
from ~lready ~dopted Community obj~ctiv0~ conc~rning futur~ d~velQpment
of new policies ~nd tXPlilnsion of ex"hlting omur:
The own re5our.ces base ;$ being eroded.
In recent years as wet l as for the foreseeable future,
~v~;lable under the present ceiling ~re contracting:
the resources
.. tr~dition8l own re-$ourees (customs duties BInd &gricuUurat levies)
!fire eonlilt~ntly being eroded rillJ I combined re$l.Ilt of themultHaurliill
reduction in import duties &nd the ;rowing &grieuLtural
ielf"sufficiency of t~e Community;
tl1e VAT bne 1ueL f grows lilt a sLower I"8JiU than Community eeonomi e
tAc:tivity becl'Jiu$e the relative stH~re of con;umer expenditure in GK)P is
felling. Thus, whH~ the mlilljor beneficiaries of Community
f!lxperu:Htul"C!!p such SIll: flillrmel"s Ind il'\tu~b;UnU of backwlillrd regions,
justly compare their $J'itual't1on with  th~t of the r~Slt of the economy,
the f1n&M~ Ii&vlmilfJilble for the Community policilU'$ hills flUen betl'lnd;.
- the Fontainebleiu ~b~tement mechlillniim has in fict decrilsed the
1"\i!!&ourCIl1$ IiIIvl!IHlIJble insofar &I!!I thei:\eil ing on VAT r,mus apply to the
individy~l Member Shhs which f1nlilncfI the ;bat(!lment ~nd not to the
Community I!I$ $ueh.
TABLE 1. : Community own re30UrCe$.
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Own resources do not cover actual expenditure.
As a r~sult of the considerable reluctance to provide additional
finance to the Community, budgetary practices have emerged which
ficticiously disguise the real impact of expenditure decisions. These
unacceptable practices have had to continue because new own re.sources
were insufficient even by the time they were finally adopted. Thus
- For the 1984 and 1985 budgets intergovernmental advances were needed
to cover legal expenditure obligations - equivalent to an increase in
the VAT rate of 0.14 % and 0. 23 % respectively. For 1986 and 1987
underbudgeting of expenditure has had to take place because of the
exhaustion of the own resources thenavai lable, equivalent to 0. 10 %
and 0. 23 % respectively;
.... For all the years concerned the Community has failed to provide
proper financial depreciation of agricultural stocks. At present,
two-thirds of the book-value of the .stocks have no counterpart in
real market value.
- Similarly, inefficient management of commitments made for a number of
multiannual programmes has resDlted in a snow-ball effect on
outstanding payment obl igations.
TABLE 2  Actual budget and true budget, as % VAT rate required for
f i nanc ing
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Actual budget VAT rate 1.00 1.23
Non-budgeted expenditure:
..;;
Current deficit (1)
Non-deprec i at i on
agricultural stocks
Cost the past"
VAT rate requi red for
proper financing
Accumulated liabilities
bi II ion ECU 12. 17.
(1) EAGGF-Guarantee deficit and traditional own resources shortfall for 1986 and
1987.
All these factors - including the intergovernmental advances, which are
repayable by the Community - result in a heavy burden weighing on the
own resources for the future.
The own resources system does not reflect ~Community developments.
Apa rt f rom an eros i on of the base and a cei ling on resources wh i ch is
lower than actual expenditure, the system itself has not been adapted
to more fundamental developments in the Community.-5-
- At best, VAT revenue produces little if any redistrjbutive effect in
relation to the relative prosperity of the Member States. This
deficiency has become only too evident after the latest enlargements
of the Community which brought in three new Member States with
incomes below the Community average and a higher propensity to
consume;.
- The system as such provides no "buffer" for a structural ded ine in
one of the components once the VAT cei ling has been reached. At its
inception, a system based on two components - traditional and VAT own
resources - seemed sufficient. Economic developments have as shown
above, made this system too rigid. Several types of own resources are
needed to render the system sufficiently flexible;.
- VAT own resources are not in reality own resources for the Community, but rather Member State constributions. As such, Community
expenditure is not subject to direct taxpayer control. Had the actual
collection of VAT in Member States been made on the harmonized VAT
base, it would have been possible for taxpayers to identify the
Community share. Similarly taxpayers would be able to react to other
di rectly collected revenue by the Community.
Problems in controlling Community expenditure.
In recent years the latent discrepancy between the Community s stated
expenditure policy and its actual budget outlays has become acutely
p ronounc ed.
For EAGGF-Guarantee expenditure a real conflict has developed between
the desi re to contain the growth in expenditure and the finance needs
stemming from Community legislation. At the same time the developments
in European as well as world farming conditions have rendered this
expenditure less efficient in achieving the objectives laid down by the
Community.
For the structural policies and other types of multiannual programmes,
the Community has opted for speedy growth and it has engaged itself
contractually, but without committing itself to provide the required
finance over the execut ion peri od. On thecont rary, the Counc i l has for
its part decided that this type of expenditure should be subject to
annual rates of increase which are far below what i$ required to
finance the commitments already entered into.
For several expenditure policies, the execution of the budgetary
appropriations has been unsatisfactory and thus contrary to spending
pol icy  be it for lack of implementing decisions or insufficient
administrative capacity at Community or Member State level.
Finally, the Community has not succeeded in its objective of correcting
some Member States ' budgetary imbalances by expenditure policy. On the
contrary, the scale of corrective mechanisms on the revenue side has
i nc reased.
All these factors imply that the Community must engage itself in medium
term planning and more effective management. Planning is needed to
obtain the desired level of management of expenditure policy, because
management does not make sense wi thout medi um term po l i cy di rect i ves.-6-
Agricultural expenditure
The impact of the CAP on the budget is conditioned by the major changes
which have taken place in the balance of agricultural markets. Two
points are particularly worthy of note
agricultural production in the Community has grown faster than
consumption and so the self-sufficiency rate for all products has
increased. It now exceeds 100 % for most major products subject to a
common organisation of the market, by a very considerable margin in
the .case of mi lk and cereals;
- similar developments affecting many other parts of the world have led
to fall ing prices on internationel markets and made the disposal of
Community surplus production more difficult and expensive.
The Community has remained very open to preferential imports of certain
agricultural products, which are very often in direct or indirect
competition with its own production. Some replace cereals in animal
feed , which would have been one way of reducing surpluses.
These developments have two maj or consequences
- intervention under the CAP has gradually become an important
component of the market rather than a way of regulating it. In many
cases, intervention is no longer the exception, but instead it has
become a permanent market out let for many maj or producers;
- the difficulties of disposing of the excess production - both in
budgetary and market terms - have led to an expansion of stocks
which as in any other area of production, is a clear sign that
markets are thorough ly out of balance.
The Community budget has had to absorb the financial consequences of
thfs imbalance. Thus, expenditure has grown by more than 5 % per year in real terms despite the difficult adjustments in CAP provisions
which have been carried out over a number of years, e.
g. 
guarantee
thresholds, milk-quotas, and co-responsibility levies.
Measured per active farmer EAGGF-Guarantee expenditure has risen by
over 8 % per year in real terms. Comparison with the average increase
in per capita value added (1.4 % per year) shows that agriculture is
becoming increasingly dependent on the Community budget. However the
increase in CAP expenditure has not contributed to supporting farmers
incomes to the same extent, because storage and disposa l costs 
including export refunds - are taking up a growing proportion of
expenditure.
The growth in agricultural stocks has meant sharp increases in the cost
to the budget of storage and the size of the stocks has in itset f
contributed to a decl ine in world prices thus increasing the cost of
di sposa l. Stock-related costs now account for one-fifth of EAGGF-
Guarantee expenditure. Moreover, not all the costs of the stocks have
yet been ref lected in the budget, because thei r va lue has been gross 
overestimated in the accounts.-7-
TABLE 3  Agricultural stocks (end-of-year levels)
Billion ECU
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Value
intervention pri ces 10. 11. 12.
Market pri ces
Depreciation
requi red 45% 49% 51% 54% 67%' 66%
The cost of the past
At thei r present level agricultural stocks represent a considerable
potential l iabi l ity on the budget. A further l iabi l ity consists in what
has become known as the "cost of the past" . This concerns in particular
the Community s Structural Funds, but also relates to development aid.
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In view of the marked increase in structural expenditure in recent years, notably due to the two latest enlargements of the Community, it
is inevitable that the volume of outstanding commitments should have risen rapidly too. Indeed, the rapid built-up of commitment
appropriations has been expressly stated Community policy as reflected
by the annual budget procedure. However, given the present regulations
and management practices the scale of the increase has given rise to
p rob l erns :-8-
- theunder-estimati.on of the time requi red to complete the political,
;;Idministrative ;;Ind technical aspects .of the operations has meant that
commitments have translated into payments ;;It a slower r;;lte than
expected. There is also ;;I tendency to inflate annU;;ll commitment
appr.opriations t.o levels bey.ond the Commission s management c;;lp;;lcity
and the abs.orpti.on capacity of the potenthl beneficiaries. The two
arms of the budgetary authority, ;;Ind also the Commission itself,
would ;;Ippear t.o share responsibi l ity for this state of affai rs;
- the failure to keep sufficiently close w;;ltch on the progress of
operations has meant th;;lt a cert;;lin volume of commitments no longer
has any re;;ll equiv;;llent in terms of projects. These c.ommitments
should quite simply be C;;lncelled but this is n.ot always possible
under the existing r.ules.
Execution .of the budget
Execution of ad.opted budgets has bec.ome m.ore difficult in recent ye;;lrs.
There are tw.o major reasons for this
Difficulties in the budgetary procedure have, with increasing
frequency, led to budgets n.ot being ad.opted unti l well into the year
t.o which they relate. This situati.on has further been c.omplicated by
the additi.on.of sizeable amending and supplementary budgets;
- The tendency for unexecuted c.ommitment and payment appropriations to
spi II .over into the next budgetary year has me;;lnt that actual
budgetary appr.opriations were greater than planned.
TABLE 4  Budget adopti.on and execution
(C.ommitment appr.opri;;lti.ons ; average 1983-85 = index 100)
Initial Suppl. Definitive Ex.ecuti.on
Budget Budget Budget (1) Same next
year year Lapsing
EAGGF-Guarantee 100. 107. 107.
Structural
poli ci es 100. 124. 112. 10.
Other
expenditure 100. 110. 98.
TOTAL 100. 111. 106.
(1 ) Including c.ommitment appr.opriati.ons remaining from previous year and
all.owing f.or transfers.
In the case of EAGGF-Guarantee expenditure, the discrepancy between the
initial budget and the appropri;;lti.ons actually needed is mainly due to
the fact that the EAGGF-Guarantee expenditure is not determined by the
budget all.ocation but by the evolution .of the agricultural markets
subject t.o the regulations in force.-9-
States has been insufficient. A substantial volume of commitment and
payment appropriations are therefore carried over each  year.  This has
impl ied that there is a substantial gap between the budget voted and
the appropriations actually available.
Budgetary discipline
Already in October 1981, the Commission set the objective that
agricultural expenditure growth should not exceed that of own
resources. This guideline was, in essence, supported by the European
Council in November 1981 and reflected in its conclusions of June 1983.
In December 1984, in responSe to the Commission report under the
Mandate of 30 May and following the conclus ions of the Stuttgart and
Fontainebleau European Counci ls, the Counci l laid down a number of
criteria for determining expenditure in line with the objective of
containing the Community budget. The effort made at Community level
reflected similar action taken by most Member States in connection with
their national budgets.
The principle laid down for the CAP was that agricultural
expenditure should increase more slowly than the own resources base
The following graphs show that from the start it has proved
impossible to take the decisions necessary to respect the
guidel ines.
GRAPH 2:  Budgetary discipline for EAGGF Guarantee
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Non-compliance with the framework laid down in 1984 is only ~rtly
due to unpredictable external factors (fall in the dollar and the
currency realignments of Apri l 1986). Indeed, the impact of these
factors is no greater than the absence of financial depreciation of
agricultural stocks. The main reason is that the budgetary
mechanisms of the CAP rule out satisfactory control of expenditure.
The Council Decision of December 1984 also sought to contain non"
compulsory expenditure within the maximum rate.
In contrast with the efforts to apply budgetary discipline to
agricultural expenditure the Commission did not go along with
these guidelines for non-compulsory expenditure, as they  are
point less as far as payment appropriations are concerned, and
contrary to expressly stated Community policies if applied blindly
to commitment appropriations. A most notable case is provision of
commitment appropriations for enlargement but the principle
applies to the implementation of the Single Act as well.
It is qui  te  clear that to contain the growth of the cost of the past
and to return to proper budget management the payment appropriations
provided should flow from the commitments decided. It is therefore o'1ly
appropriate to apply budgetary discipline to commitment appropriations
and to do this only with due respect given to the political undertaking by the competent authority in the Community prior to the annual
budgetary process.
The Fontainebleau mechanism
Prior to Fontainebleau two formal attempts were made to avoid
excessive" negative net budgetary flows, the first by application of
Arts. 130 and 131 of the Treaty of Accession and the second via the
Finan,~ial Mechanism
The first method, analogous to that in force in respect of Spain and
Portugal i.e. a sl iding scale of contribution reaching 100 % after 5
years, plus an extension for two years , by imposing a limit on the rate
of growth of contributionso!' was, in the case of the UK , only partial ly
succesful. It became obvious in 1974/75 that the UK was already a
substantial  net  contributor to the Community budget. The second method
the "Financial Mechanism was then installed in an attempt to reduce
the UK deficit. From its inception in 1976 to its effective end in
1984, the mechanism did not once produce a refund to the UK despite
inc reas i ng net negat i ve budget flows. Refunds were, however, made on an
ad hoc basis in respect of 1980-85.
The 1986 budget contains the first correction of the imbalance under
the mechanism adopted at Fontainebleau.
The fol lowing table shows the amounts involved and the effect of the
mechanism on the available VAT margin.-11-
TABLE 5 : Cost of the Fontainebleau mechanism
Average (1)
1983-1985 1986 1987(s)
Gross correction
- mill ion ECU
- % VAT rate
1 530 2 736 2 360
(1)
(s)
Fictitious application.
Estimation.
The Fontainebleau mechanism did mark the end of a protracted conflict
within the Community. But it should be borne in mind that:
- it lowered the effective VAT caLL-in rate to less than 1. 25%, thereby
depriving the Community of some of its resources;
- no account is taken in the arrangements for financing the
compensation of the relative prosperity of the contributing
countries;
- reference is made, albeit indi rect ly, to traditional own resources,
which thus lose thei r rightful status of belonging to the Community.-12-
SECOND PART, : Proposa l s for new own resources
In presenting its proposals for new own resources, the Commission intends to
lay the foundations for a reform of the budget system which wi II remedy the
shortcomings of the current situation and at the same time give the community
the resources and mechanisms it needs to develop in line with the ambitions of
the Single Act.
The Commission s objectives are as follows:
a) to provide the Community with a margin of own resources sufficient to
guarantee it a fai rly lengthy period of "budget security" during whi ch it
can plan its development especially for the period in which the internal
market is being achieved;
b) to change the composition of own resources in order to obtain greater
stabi l ity of revenue and a distribution of the burden of finance more in
keeping with the relative prosperity of the Member States;
c) to extend and strengthen measures to ensure compliance with budgetary
discipl ine arrangements which reconci le the constraints of a strict
allocation of resources and the need to develop common policies;
d) to change both attitudes and rules which govern the preparation and the
execution of the budget in order to manage the budget with maximum economy
of resources, to increase the transparency of budget decision-making and to
impose stricter control over expenditure;
e) to continue to provide the compensation needed to correct various budget
imbalances on a basis which makes greater allowance for the relative
prosperi ty of the Member States.
The Commission is presenting its proposals to Parliament and the Council so
that the two arms of the budgetary authority can conduct their own assessment.
The first condition to be borne in mind is that the Community must be given
the resources it needs if it is not to find itself unable to pay amounts it
owes situation which is a definite threat in view of the difficulties
already besetting the 1987 budget.-13-
Looking beyond this immediate problem the Commission is convinced that the
measures it proposes wi II give the Community the budgetary instruments it
needs to finance common measures, in particular those provided for by the
Single Act, whi le complying with the necessary budgetary restraint.
The Commission s proposals are designed to satisfy certain requir.ements: the
need for stabi l ity and greater certainty in budget matters; the need to
preserve economic and social cohesion in the face of the changes arising from
the recent enlargement and the achievement of the internal market; and the
need to outline budget discipline arrangements which will help secure a
consensus between the two arms of the budgetary authori ty.
I. Budgetary discipline
1 The volume of additional own resources proposed by the Commission should
enable the Community to finance its development unti l 1992 at least whi le
enjoying greater "budget security" than in the pastA The Commission wi II
thus have budgets containing the expenditure it will actually inour and
wi II no longer have to resort to the expedient of deferring expenditure to
hide the i mba lance between revenue and expend i tu re.
However, the Commission considers that the creation of this new margin
must be accompanied by tighter budget discipline and greater stringency in
the establishment and execution of the budget. The proposals for a higher
own resources ceiling and those for tougher discipline arrangements and
greater strictness of management thus constitute an indivisible whole.
For the Commission, this link between the two aspects is vital for the
balance of its proposals. It would therefore ask the Counci l and
Par l i ament to devote as much attent i on to the substance of the rules and
practices it has proposed for discipl ine and budget management as to its
proposals concerning the composition and new cei ling for own resources.
2 The Community s budget policy for the next five years must be founded on a
new institutional base. This will require a new interinstitutional
agreement in which Commission Counci l and Parl i.ament will solemnly
undertake:
- to manage the Community budget in such a way that the new own resources
ceiling will be respected until 1992 at least;
- to treat the multi annual forecasts as an instrument of medium-term
budget management illustrating - within the own resources limit - the
budget trade-offs and the evolving shape of annual budgets;
- to view the commitment appropriations as the expression of the desired
budget policy and hence as the reference basis for budgetary discipline.
Commitments would then automati cally be covered by the volume of
available resources.
The conclusion of such an agreement would give the Community, for the next
five years at least the degree of stability, security and consensus
between the institutions which wi II enable the budget to go on playing its
role in the development of common pol icies whi le satisfying the principle
of strict management to which national budgets are subject today.-14-
3 As the Member States are doing with thei r own budgets, the Community must
endeavour to tighten budgetary discipline. But this cannot be seen as an
end in itself totally eclipsing the objectives which the Community has
set itself and which the budget must help attain. On the contrary it must
be seen as a method of achieving a better allocation of avai lable
resources by producing a s.cale of priorities for the medium term.
Budgetary discipline must be maintained by applying the following three
criteria.
a) The new limit must provide sufficient room to finance the common
policies until 1992 at least, in terms of both payments and
commitments. The significance of this quantitative constraint must be
seen in true perspect i ve.
The average annual growth rate for resources avai lable to the Community
between 1980 and 1987 was around 4. 5% in real terms (see Table 6). Even
if it is assumed that all available resources wi II be taken up in 1992,
the corresponding rate for 1987-92 wi II be only very sl ight ly higher
(4. 6%) .
It can thus be seen that the new cei ling wi II not give the Community
greater growth potential for expenditure than it enjoyed between 1980
and 1987.
Tab le 6
Community own resources and GOP
(average annual growth rate in volume)
1980-1987 1987-1992
Own resources (1)
GNP (EUR 12)
(1) Per capita,
for 1987.
taking into account the financing of the deficit expected
The maintenance of roughly the same growth rate must also be viewed in the light of the expenditure needed to restore a sound budget
situation (disposal of stocks and cost of the past).
A truer comparison of trends during these two periods would demand an
increase in the growth rate for own resources during the period 1980-
1987 to take account of the fai lure to finance these two aspects
correctly. What is more this also means that some future resources
wi II be taken up to offset the non-availabl i l ity of resourc.es in the
previous period.
Table 6 also shows that economic growth should be higher in the period
1987-92 according to the forecasts now avai lable. The difference
between the increase in own resources actually called in and the
production of wealth in the Community should therefore narrow
app rec i ab ly.-15-
These two facts clearly show that compliance with the cei ling fixed for
1992 wi II mean a marked slackening in the relative rate of growth of
the Community budget.
b) Agricultural expenditure must be made subject to discipline
arrangements providing the instruments for genuine containment of
expendi ture.
The first th i ng to do must be to def i ne what exactly is meant by the
containment of expenditure.
The criterion would be that expenditure on agricultural
management must not grow faster than the own resources base.
market
The definition of what agricultural expenditure should be subject to
this maximum rate would be that contained in Article 3(a) of the
conclusions of the Counci l of 4 December 1984 on the application of
budgetary discipline. This overall figure must also cover costs
connected with the disposal and depreciation of agricultural stocks.
The criterion would have to be appl ied year by year whi le the results
in terms of containing expenditure would be assessed over a three-year
period. This means that for, say, the 1988 budget , EAGGF-Guarantee
expenditure would be determined by applying to actual expenditure in
1987 the rate of growth of the own resources base.
The essential condition for achieving this objective on a lasting basis
is that production must be contained. However, to ensure that the
annual budget allocations for agriculture are not exceeded, the
Commission is proposing that budgetary stabilizers be introduced in all
sectors either to achieve expenditure savings or to generate additional
revenue, depending on the sector, so that annual expenditure financed
by own resources can be maintained within the establ ished limits.
Automati c budgetary st.abi lizers already exist in a number of sectors;
othe.r expenditure stabi lizing mechanisms have just been reinforced or
included by the Commission with its price proposals for 1987/88
Coilseeds and olive oil). The reduction of milk quotas, the increase in
coresponsibility levies for cereals and mi lk and cuts in aid when
production thresholds are ~verstepped are all instruments that can be
used to contain agricultural expenditure financed by own resources. The
difference is that existing mechanisms would now be applied strictly so
that in no case would the over.all budget allocations be exceeded, and
they would be unavoidable, coming into operation automatically.
This will impose a dual obligation on the Commission and the Council.
The .Commission for its part wi II have to consider itself bound to
present to the Counci l appropriate stabi l izing measures whenever it
feels that there is a serious risk of an expenditure overrun. The
Council, for its pare must undertake to act swiftly on the
Com,:ission I s proposals.
To achieve this,
regu tat ions:
rules wi II have to be added to the agricultural-16-
- enabl ing the Commission to adjust the intervention arrangements
within predetermined limits in order to achieve certain savings in
market management at least as a precautionary measure pending the
Counci l' s decisions;
- requiring the Council to ~ct within clear and short deadlines (three
months, say) on any Commission proposals relating to the more
important aspects of the market organizations.
It will be the Commission s responsibility to take this action in good
time before the risk of overspending has actually become a real
overrun. For this purpose the commission will look for ways of
improving its forecasting of expenditure, notably by means of monthly
monitoring of execution.
In addition to the annual allocations provided by application of the
budgetary discipline rules there will also be a reserve to finance the
budgetary impact of any exceptional ci rcumstances caused by monetary
movements. This reserve will draw its resources from savings made in
relation to a basic currency parity CECU/dollar rate) and it wi II be
used to finance any additional expenditure resulting from parity
developments which impose higher costs on the CAP.
In any event , if, despite these measures, a deficit appeared inevitable
in EAGGF Guarantee expenditure either because the Counci l fai led to
adopt the measures proposed by the Commission, because these measures
did not produce the expected budgetary results or because the
contingency reserve proved inadequate, notably as a result of
unforeseeable monetary events, finance for this deficit would have to
be provided by a letter of amendment or a supplementary budget. The
overrun financed would have to be offset by equivalent savings over the
next two years.
The changeover from a system of advances to a system of repayments for
the EAGGF Guarantee wi II provide more control over expenditure, since
spending will then be possible only if the necessary resources are
actually avai lable and the appl ications for payments fully justified.
The Commission will present a formal proposal on this subject.
Appl ication of these principles would change significantly the present
situation where agricultural regulations have direct repercussions in
budget terms; instead, agricultural rules will be applied or amended
in such a way as to ensure that predetermined budget allocations are
respected.
c) Third criterion for ensuring compt iance with budgetary discipline: 
the multi annual budget forecasts must become an instrument of budget
management for the medium term.
Instead of remaining a simple forecasting exercise proposed by the
Commission but virtually ignored by the budgetary authority, these
multiannual forecasts would become an instrument for the medium-term
planning of Community finances.
At the beginning of the year the Commission would propose multiannual
forecasts, setting out the options which reconci le budgetary discipl ine
and respect for the own resources cei ling with the development of-17-
common policies. The budgetary authority would consider these
forecasts and the two arms would express thei r opinions on the main
trade-offs they involve and on the plans they set out for financing the
Community s main activities. This would have to be done by a firm
deadl ine, ahead of the examination of the preliminary draft.
If the two arms of the budgetary authority fai led to agree, the
Commission could consider that the intentions set out in the
multiannual forecasts might serve as a framework in which the annual
budgets would have to be fitted.
The Commission and the budgetary authority would have to ensure every
year that the multiannual budget forecasts setting out the maximum
overall spending limits for the budget for each year up to 1992 were
bei ng respected. For non-compu l sory expendi ture th i s means that the
annual increase will be above the maximum rate but below the annual
ceiling set by the multiannual forecasts.
The multi annual forecasts would also become an instrument of budgetary
discipl ine since they would have to trace a regular and gradual
development of expenditure avoiding any unduly rapid drain on the new
resources avai lable and leave a safety margin within the overall limit
for the end of the period. In concrete terms this means that:
- the annual level of expenditure for the enti re budget must not be
above the figure on the trend line linking the present level to the
end-of-period level;
the new basic own resources decision should specify the annual
ceil ings as produced by this trend line, which must be sufficient to
finance all the necessary expenditure (including stock depreciation);
any proposal for exceeding the maximum rate for non-compulsory
expenditure, whether made by the Commission or one of the arms of the
budgetary authority, would have to be justified by significant policy
developments notably in connection with the application of the
Single Act.
The budgetary di.scipline inherent in these multiannual forecasts would
be defined in terms of commitment appropriations, the pattern of
payments being dictated by the needs resulting from the administrative
and technical implementation of the operations undertaken. This means
that the cei ling on own resources must be respected up to 1992 as
regards both commitment ~ppropriations and payment ~ppropriations.
The definition of budgetary discipline in terms of commitment
appropriations is a very important departure from the present rules. It
is justified by the fact that they reflect the political will and
policy options of the budgetary authority. Moreover, if commitment
appropriations are made to develop in an orderly manner, then budgetary
discipline and the ceiling will automatically be respected in payment
appropriations too. As the Commission has demonstrated in the
multiannual budget forecasts which it is presenting separately, if the
new cei ling is respected for commitments, the uti l ization of the new
resources for payments will be appreciably lower.-18-
Finally, it is a principle of sound management that all decisions taken
must be matched by appropriate entries in the budget. This principle
must be strictly applied, in particular for the agricultural price
dec is ions.
I I. Budget management
1 Drawing the conclusions from its analysis of the way in which the budget
is prepared and executed, the Commission considers that the following
aspects are the most critical as regards the improvement of managelilent:
a) provision of excessive appropriations in particular differentiated
appropriations, in a large number of headings, resulting from an
overestimate of spending capacity, in particular when new operations
are being launched, or from an underestimate of the time needed to
obtain from the Counci l the legal base to use the appropriations. This
tendency is encouraged ~y the carryover faci lities.
b) Insufficient compliance with the principle of budget annuality, for the
reasons set out above leading to a large volume of appropriations
being carried over from one year to the next. This detracts from budget
transparency since the appropriations avai lable for a given financial
year are of different sorts, some being provided by the budgetary
authority for that financial year while other substantial amounts are
left remaining because previous decisions have not been implemented.
c) Inadequate monitoring of the operations or programmes for which
commitments have been made, leading to appreciable deviations from the
planned schedules. This goes a long way towards explaining why the
appropriations entered in the budget are so unreliable  guide and
uti l i~ation rates inadequate. Another consequence is the formation of a
large volume of "dormant commitments , i  e.  commitments which no longer
have a real counterpart in the form of projects or programmes to be
financed.
d) Community operations are not always as cost-effective as they might be.
In some cases, the same objectives could be achieved with a smaller
volume of expenditure and/or by different procedures.
The Commission is proposing changes to both the practices and the rules
which govern the preparation and execution .of the budget in order to
restrict the volume of resources to be called in and to improve the
allocation to the objectives pursued. These changes are the essential
accompaniment to the criteria for budgetary discipline set out above and
should facilitate compliance with them. The ultimate aim is to acquire
tighter control over expenditure and make it more effective.
2 The Commission is proposing the following two-track approach with the aim
of reducing the risk of excessive appropriations to a minimum:
With regard to practices the Commission undertakes to ensure that its
requests for appropriations correspond as closely as possible to actual
implementation possibi lities, account also being taken of the absorption
capacity of potential recipients which can be adjusted only gradually
when an operation is new. It wi II request the budgetary authority to pay
more attention, when the budget is adopted, to the assessments presented
by the Commission in justifying the amounts requested.-19~'
More precisely, the Commission would like the budgetary authority not to
increase the appropriations in certain headings unti l it has ascertained
that they can actua lly be used.
multiannual approach to expenditure planning wi II provide the
possibi lity of staggering the impact of political decisions to step up
spending on certain operations.
The Commission wi II attach to its proposals for commitment
appropr i at i ons schedu les for the corresponding payment appropriations.
To be as reliable as possible, these schedules must be drawn up in close
collaboration with the authorities responsible, since their help is
essential if good-quality forecasts are to be produced.
The Commission undertakes to inform the budgetary authority whenever 
observes any significant divergence from the initially planned schedule.
2 The Commission is proposing changes in the role of title  10/8  with a
view to limiting the volume of resources called in to the strict
minimum.
There are two proposed changes:
- Firstly, Chapter 101 would accommodate an overall reserve which could
be used if there were insufficient appropriations under any particular
budget headi ng. It wou ld then be poss i b le to li mit the amount of
resources which needed to be called in. The appropriations entered
in the headings could initially be fixed at a conservative level and
the overall reserve wouLd produce a sort of "economy of scale" during
execution, since it is unlikely that additional requirements would
arise at the same time for all the headings concerned.
- Secondly, Chapter 100 would still accommodate appropriations which do
not yet have .a legal base, in accordance with the rules currently in
force. Not later than 1 October each year the Commission would ask the
budgetary authority to transfer the relevant amounts to the headings
which have received a legal base. As regards amounts for which no
legal base has been created by that date, the Commission s policy
would be not to propose any alternative u.se. These appropriations
would then automatically lapse at the end of the year. The Commission
will judge on a case-by-case basis whether or not to propose the re-
entry of the appropriations the following year. The revenue
corresponding to the unused appropri ations could therefore be added to
the balance for the year.
These two proposed measures would also help to enhance the annual nature
of the budget.
3 In any event, some other provisions would have to be adopted in order 
reinforce the principle of budget annual ity more di rectly.
The current budget rules allow appropriations to be systematically carried
over to subsequent years. This faci l ity is justified in many respects, in
particular when the criteria for a proper decision on expenditure are not
met. However it does have the drawback of encouraging lax attitudes in
the requesting and granting of appropriations and of giving no incentive
for rigour in the use of the appropriations .available.-20-
To restore greater transparency to the appropriations avai lable and to
ensure greater compliance with the principle of budget annual ity, the
Commission proposes that:
- the automatic arrangement whereby commitment appropriations remain in
existence and payment appropriations are carried over should be
di scontinued. This would requi re appropriate changes to the Financial
Regulation and to specific regulations, in particular those for the
structural Funds. AS a result, any appropriation not used in year (n)
and for which the Commission has not proposed some uti l ization in year
(n + 11 wi II lapse;
- the budgetary authority should be informed at the beginning of the year
how the Commission intends to use appropriations which have not lapsed.
Three possibi l ities exist:
a) carryover under the same heading;
b) carryover to another heading;
c) carryover to the overall reserve in Chapter 101.
The Commission s choice will depend on its analysis of the reasons why
the appropriations have not been used.
The budgetary authority would thus be told expl ici tly what
appropriations are available under each heading for the new budget year.
Moreover the overall reserve in Chapter 101, which can receive the
car ryove rs as ment i oned above, cou ld become a k i nd of pe rmanent rese rve.
All these measures are requi red in order to:
make authorizing officers and potential recipients more careful in
thei r forecasts;
- strip the budget of any superfluous appropriations;
- give a clear and homogenous base to the appropriations avai lable for
the financial year.
4 On the matter of improving the monitoring of budget operations the
Commission wi II take appropriate internal measures to ensure that the
budget is executed as closely as possible in line with forecasts. For
this it must be able to count on the cooperation of the national
administrations.
The new obligation requi ring any major departures from the schedules laid
down to be notified to the budgetary authority together with explanations
represents an additional incentive to respect forecasts.
The Commission has also launched an operation to check "dormant
commitments , i.e. past commitments for which no payments have been made
for an abnormally long time. It has found that the volume of these
dormant commitments is relatively large and that a good many of them
could be purely and simply cancelled. A large number of Social Fund
appropriations have already been cancelled, thus reducing the cost of the
past.
In some cases this approach concerning "dormant commitments" may requi 
changes to existing regulations.-21-
The utilization of structural Fund appropriations will be made e.asier by
the development of operations under programmes drawn up jointly with
national administrations.
The Commission responsibility for monitoring implementation will be
reduced since the Member States will be involved more directly in the
management of these programmes.
To sum up, the Commission intends to introduce arrangements which will
make it possible to implement appropriations allocated in line with
forecasts and to cancel without delay any appropriations which cannot be
used as planned.
5 The Commission intends to carry out a systematic examination of budget
operations to ensure that the intended incentive factor is obtained  the lowest cost to the budget. This is particularly necessary for
structural operations, where there is a case for establishing new rules
better suited to the nature of the proj ect and/or programme and to the
specific requirements of the promoters.
It is with this in mind that the Commission is seeking to develop its
financial engineering capacity by which it intends, with a low budget
outlay, to arrange the financing of projects by drawing as far as possible
on funds avai lable on the market.
In the same vein, current ideas concerning the operation of the structural
Funds would allow for budget subsidies to be combined with Community loans
in certain cases when the nature of the project permits.
This approach also means that the possibility of budget operations in
forms other than a mere subsidy wi II be examined. For instance, repayable
advances and the provision of guarantees could provide valuable support
for the achievement of certain programmes or projects.
Development of these new rules could reduce budget costs while maintaining
a satisfactory level of effectiveness for Community operations.
6 Finally, budget management can be improved by increasing transparency
and regularly monitoring execution. The Commission is planning first of
all to alter budget presentation in order to include information on the
composition of expenditure which will clearly show to what extent the
various items are definite and unavoidable (regardless of whether they are compulsory or non-compulsory) when they result from say,
commitments entered into (e.
g. 
structural Funds) or international
agreements involving definite amounts. By contrast other items of
expenditure, although classified compulsory, may be adjusted each year.
And then some chapters of the budget , such as the agricultural chapters
are more by way of technical estimates even if they are compulsory
within the meaning of the Treaty. As regards agricultural expenditure,
the new elements in the budgetary discipline arrangements will be of
signi ficance.
To sum up, the object of this innovation in presentation wi II be to show
the margin of manoeuvre actually available for establishing the budget.
As regards budget monitoring, the Commission has already taken steps to
improve the item-by-item monthly information on execution. This will
make it possible to detect at a very early stage any delays in-22-
execution to analyse their causes and to take appropriate action in
good time. By means of other internal management measures, it will also
be ,possible to obtain smoother execution of the budget over the year.
III. The Community s financing needs
1 In the financial perspective 1988-92, the Commission outl ined the way in
which Community expenditure wi II develop in coming years.
Compared with previous years, two points need to be emphasized:
- these forecasts illustrate and justify the Commission s proposal fo
raising the own resources cei ling. In particular, they demonstrate the
budgetary impact of policies already in force and new operations that
the Community is to launch under the Single Act;
- they represent the first application of the Commission s proposed
arrangements for budgetary discipline. This is the basis on which the
budgetary authority will have to define the medium-term growth path
for the annual budget exercises.
2 The multiannual financial perspective 1988-92 .shows the practical effect
of the Commission s proposed principles for giving a clear and sound
basis to budgetary discipline. These principles are as follows:
- the EAGGF Guarantee allocation will grow at the same pace as the own
resources base;
- the volume of commitment appropriations and payment appropriations for
the enti re budget will, in 1992, still be below the ceiling of 1.4% of
Community GNP;
- a safety margin is sti II available in 1992; in terms of payment
appropriations, it is even substantial (0. 12% of GNP or 4 900 mi II ion
ECU at 1987 pri ces);
the new own resources margin is taken up gradually; in 1990... for
instance, the resources necessary would be 1. 28% of GNP for commitment
appropriations and 1. 21% for payment appropriations.
3 The main
fo llows :
growth assumptions for expenditure can be summari zed 
appl ication of the maximum growth rate allowed by the budgetary
di scipl ine arrangements would result in the EAGGF Guarantee accounti 
for slightly over 50% of the budget in 1992 compared with 60% .t the
beginning of the period;
- in real terms the structural Funds would double between now and 1992
in terms of commitment appropriations; they would then account for
some 25% of the budget.
- expenditure on research on the bas is of the proposa ls for the next
framework programme would represent 3% of the budget as against 2.
at present;-23-
development cooperation expenditure would increase sharply at the end
of the period on the assumption that the 7th EDF will be included in
the budget;
- a margin is left for new pol ides;
around 5% in 1992.
it wi II increase gradually to
The main figures for the structure of the budget
appropriations are set out in the following table.
commi tment
TABLE 7 : Structure of expenditure 1987-92 - Commitment appropriations %
(Mio Ecu)
-- - - - -- - - --- - - - - - - ---- -- -- - - --- -- -- -- ------ ---- - - - --- - - ------ -- ---- - ---- ----- - ---
AT 1987 PRICES
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
-- - -- - - - -- ---- - - - --- - --- -- - - - ----- --- - ----- - ------- - - -- - - ------ - - - ---- - --- -------
EAGGF-Guarantee 25780 26420 27090 27770 28490 29210
2. St ructura l operations 7230 7440 9460 10860 12450 14290
0ther policies 2600 2990 3490 3750 4470 5010
Refunds and admini s-
tration 7300 7620 6280 5840 5450 5430
New policies 500 1100 1700 2200 2800
-- - - --- - - - -- - - - - - -- --- - ---- - -- - - - - - -- -- -- - - -- - - -- -- - - - - - -  --- --- ---- - -- ----- ------
TOTAL 42910 44970 47420 49920 53060 56740
-- - - - -- - - -- - - - - -- -- -- - - -- -- - -- - - - - -- --- - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - -- ----- - - - - - - - -- - --------
With this expenditure pattern the average annual growth rate over the
period at constant prices would be 4.8% in payment appropriations and
8% in commitment appropriations.
4 The Commission feels that this budget scenario, both overall and in the
individual components reconci les the need to develop common pol ides
and the rigour r.equired by budgetary discipline.
In particular it should be stressed that the effort proposed for the
strutural Funds is in line with the objective of economic and social
cohesion highlighted by the Single Act. The reform of the Funds on which
the Commission has embarked is intended to enhance the effectiveness of
thei r contribution to economic convergence and to reinforce the support
that they must provide to facilitate the economic adjustment required to
comp tete the i nterna l market.
As regards new policies, the main point at this stage is to leave the
budgetary margin necessary for them to be introduced as and when
required. This is notably the case for environment policy.
Finally, the allocation for the CAP can be considered adequate to
safeguard the Community nature of this policy provided that the
agriculture regulations and market management arrangements are adapted
to correct the persistent imbalances which affect these markets.-24-
The multiannual financial perspective is presented in greater detai L in
Section III of this document.
IV. The new own resoUr.ces system
1. The Commission is proposing three major changes to the current own
resources system:
(a) The new cei ling on Community revenue should be expressed in terms of
GNP. In order to meet the Community s needs on the basis of the multi-
annual 1987-1992 estimates which it has established, the Commission
wi l l propose that the dec i s i on on the Communi ty' s own resources shou ld
state (as a percentage of the GNP and in absolute values) the cei ling
each year on the own resources that can be called in, and should do this
wi thin a cei ling of 1. 4% of the Community GNP, unti l 1992.
(b) The composition of Community resources should be changed by means of
a number of minor adjustments to traditional own resources (customs
duties), alterations to the arrangements for collecting VAT resources
and measures to make the resources paid by each Member State match
more closely its contributive capacity.
(c) A greater degree of flexibi l ity should be introduced into the own
resources system so that it wi II be easier than at present to offset,
within the agreed cei ling, any shortfall in one or other component of
own resources.
The Commission s intention in asking that the maximum resources
avai lable to the Community up to 1992 be fixed at 1. 4% of Community GNP is
to ensure that the Communi ty can obtai  the funds it requi res to :
- apply the common policies, notably those provided for in the Single Act
which are needed to maintain economic and social cohesion;
- tackle present problems notably as regards agricultural stocks and
outstanding commitments for structural operations;
- enjoy a sufficiently long period of "budgetary security" to be able to
plan the development of policies of which the principle has already been
agreed.
It is essential to recall two points which have already been set out in
the section on budget discipline
- The cei ling must be respected up to 1992 in terms of both appropriations
for payments and appropriations for commitments.
- The amount of the new margin taken up must rise regularly and smoothly
to avoid any risk of the ceil ing being reached before the end of 1992.
3 The establishment of a maximum amount of own resources available to the
Community in terms of GNP is an important departure from the current
system.
This innovation has the following advantages
- The volume of resources is linked to the most representative indicator
of economic growth. This practice is becoming more and more common in
the Member States, which now define their budget objectives in terms of
GNP. The Community would be following suit.;-25-
The decision allocating the Community a given volume of budget funds
would be more transparent and more secure since it would no longer be
subject to the effects of erosion or instability affecting current own
resources.
- It would no longer be necessary to set a ceiling for each type of
resource - one cei ling would apply to the total. This would also allow
greater flexibi l ity in the composition and breakdown of resources for
the Community budget.
4 In addition to this new arrangement for determining the limit for all
resources, the Commission is proposing a number of changes to the sources
of finance themselves. These wi II be discussed in detai l later in the
document.
The main objective of these changes is to introduce a degree of
progessivity in some types of revenue, to div.ersify them and to increase
the proportion of revenue collected di rect from Community citizens.
5 At present, the Commission is proposing four types of resource
- customs duties, with a number of changes to the present arrangements;
- agricultural levies;
- 1% of the actual VAT base (including zero-rated products);
- additional resources obtained by applying a call-in rate, set at the
level required each year to finance the budget, to an "additional base
representing the difference between each country s GNP .and actual VAT
base as defined above.
The flex ibil ity of the new system proposed by the Commi ssion would allow
one of these resources (e.g. the additional base) to be reduced or
replaced by a new source of revenue. If for instance, progress towards
completing the internal market made it possible or even desi rable, a new
form of community taxation could be introduced based on the achievements
made in harmonizing certain bases. This is why the Commission is proposing
that provision be made for the possibi l ity of other resources being
introduced, if necessary, between now and 1992, still subject to the 1.
GNP ceiling.
Since the overall limit of Community resources would be fixed, there would be less difficulty involved in determining the breakdown of these
resources.
6 Changes to the arrangements concerning customs duties
Payment to the Community of customs duties on products covered by the
ECSC Treaty
Only customs duties on ECSC products are not now paid over to the
Community but are kept instead by the Member States.
However the Decision of 7 May 1985 on the Communities ' system of own
resources provides that revenue from Common Customs Tariff duties and
other duties established or to be established by the institutions of the
Communities in respect of trade with non-member countries constitute own
resources entered in the Community budget.-26-
It would therefore be logical for ECSC duti.es to be paid into the
general budget like those on all other products.
The Commission therefore reiterates the request it has already made on a
number of occasions in the past and which has Parliament's support, that
they be transferred to the Communities. In 1986 they were worth some 180
million ECU.
Dropping the 10% refund to Member States for the cost of collecting own
resources
Article 5 of the Decision of 7 May 1985 on the Communities
' .
system of
own resources provides that the Communities refund to each Member State
10% of the amount of traditional own resources paid over (customs
duties agricultural levies, sugar levies) in order to cover collection
expenses.
These refunds totalled 1 049 mi llion ECU in 1985 and wi II be 1 240
million ECU in 1986 and around 1 300 million ECU in 1987.
They are intended to cover the costs incurred by the Member States in
collecting own resources. A flat-rate system was chosen because it is
impossible to determine the exact costs for each Member State. However,
it must be said that the refunds constitute a neutral operation in terms
of the overall financing of the Community, since to finance them merely
requires an increase in the VAT call-in rate (roughly 0.07% on the basis
of the draft budget for 1987).
The Commission is proposing that this 10% refund should be discontinued
and would adduce the following arguments.
The Member States do incur real expenses in collecting revenue; but the
system of flat-rate refunds, whi ch cannot be replaced by di rect
evaluation is not a guarantee of fai rness. Eliminating a two-way cash
flow would increase transparency, reduce administrative costs and
simplify budget presentation. It is aLso worth noting that this system
of refunds was not extended to VAT own resources.
Eliminating the 10% refund would involve amending the Decision of 7 May
1985. A more flexible solution might be for the Member States to waive
their claim to it. However most of them would have to obtain the
approval of their national parliaments to do so.
The reduction in expenditure resulting from this measure and the
breakdown between Member States is illustrated for 1987 in Table 8
below, together with figures for customs duties on ECSC products.-27-
Table 8
ECSC customs duties and refunds of collection costs
for traditional own resources
(1987 prel iminary draft, in mi II ion ECU)
ECSC customs 10% refunds Total
dut i es (collection costs)
7(1)
318 392
GR.
125 129
174 188
IRL
143 172
111 120
265 285
306
(1) Including Luxembourg.
7 Changes in VAT revenue
Under the present arrangements, the key to the Community s VAT resources
is a uniformly defined base to which the Community may apply a maximum
call-in rate of 1.4% to finance its spending.
The advantage of this mechanism is that, in principle, the Member States
enjoy equal treatment and a certain contribution is made towards the
harmonization of VAT systems. However it has the following drawbacks as
regards financing the Community budget:
- VAT revenue tends to be regressive, as the percentage of GNP accounted
for by the VAT base falls as the standard of living increases.
- It suffers from erosion, partly for the same reasons, which means that
the call-in rate has to be regularly increased to obtain an equiv~tent
volume of resources in terms of GNP.
- The current VAT receipts are not re~lly own resources since there is no
direct link between actual collection and payment to the Community.  fact, they are more like a national contribution based on a harmonized
base, especially as they appear in the national budgets as a transfer to
the Community.
The Commission is proposing two changes to the current system to remedy
these shortcomings.-28-
1 1% levy on the base actually subject to VAT
The Member States wou ld pay the Community 1 % of the base actua lly
subject to VAT. This is the general rule which will be fully applicable
once the VAT structures and rates have been brought into line under the
"indi rect taxation section of the plan for completing the internal
market. In the meantime there is the problem of zero-rated transactions.
With an eye to the achievement of the internal market it would .seem
reasonable to apply the 1% levy to zero-rated goods and services. The
Community would thus receive a proportion of the revenue that the Member
States actually derive from the application of their VAT system.
For example, a Member State with a single rate of 14% woulc;l transfer to
the Community one fourteenth of its VAT revenue. If a: country had
several rates ~ say 6%, 10% and 18% - it would pay to the Community
budget - in th is case - one sixth, one tenth and one eighteenth of the
revenue from each of these rates.
Payments would be made to the Community as and when the  tax  was
collected nationally, i.e. monthly as for customs duties and Levies. The
sums would no longer pass through the national budgets, . which would
merely re.cord the balance after deduction of the di rect contribution to
the Community. This would enhance its nature as an own res.ource and
establish a more direct link between the Community and all the
businesses and individuals engaging in economic activity.
2 Levy on the "additional base
Since the 1% levy on the actual VAT base is fixed, additional resources
will be needed.to cover the total budget each year.
Take 1987 as an example: since the VAT yield is 23 300 million ECU and
appl ication of the 1% levy to the actual base produces 17 800 mi II ion
ECU, a shortfall of 5 500 mi llion fCU would remain~
The additional funds needed to finance the budget would come from a
financial contribution to be provided by the Member States by applying a
uniform rate (0. 29% in 1987) to a base defined as the difference between
GNP and the actual VAT base used for the 1% levy.
The total GNP of the Member States would thus serve as a basis for
financing the Community budget, but the call-in rates for the Clctual VAT
base and the "additional base" would di ffer.
This "additional base" covers economic aggregates such as investment,
part of public consumption and net exports.
Table 9 shows the breakdown by Member State of contributions from the 1%
levy on the actual base and the levy on the additional base and compares
these results with the breakdown under the current VAT system.-29-
Tab le 9
Financing shares
(% of total - 1987 budget) 1)
Harmoni zed
VAT base
Actual VAT base 
(%)
+ additional base
Additional base
IRL
27, 27,
20,
1.5,
20,
- - - - - - -- - - -- - - - - -- - - - -- - - ------ - -- - -- - - -- - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- --- - - - - - ------
EUR-12 100, 100, 100
- -- - - - - - - -- -- - - -- - - - -- -- -----
(1) Exchange rates of 12. 1987
To ensure that the amounts paid each month to the Community were as closely
as possible in line with Member States actual receipts, the Commission
would make an estimate of the two bases short ly before the start of the
budget year and by reference to these est i mates wou ld propose the monthly
payments to be made by the Member States. A correction would be made later
in the light of the bases actually established.
8 Overall impact of the new system on financing the budget
Table 10 shows how each country would contribute to financing the 1987
budget if the changes proposed by the Commission were already in effect.
The main point to emerge is that the overall result of the Commission
new proposals is a better match between each country s contribution to
budget financing and its relative prosperity. A further advantage is that
the size of the UK problem would be reduced.T
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9 Institutional and legal implications
1 A number of institutional and legal instruments will be required to give
effect to the Commission s proposals for the new system of Community own
resources and the new budg~tary discipl ine arrangements.
This is n~cessary, first of all, so that the institutions concerned -
Parliament Council and Commission - can accept the content of the
proposals and apply them on the basis of rules which are known in
advance and wh i ch offer each of them a sat i sf actory ba lance between
rights and obligations..
second important point concerns the conditions in which the new
mechani sm wi II operate so that up to 1992 at least th~ budgetary
procedure and budget financing wi II be governed by provisions already
determined in their broad principles.
2 It has already been stated in the section devoted to budgetary
discipline that those arrangements should be enshrired in a solemn and
binding agreement between the three institutions which wi II form the
basi s for the new own resources system.
The main points of thisagreament will be as follows:
- the new ceiling will be respected scrupulously until 1992 at least, in
both appropriations for payments and appropriations for commitments
(as too wi II the intermediate annual cei lings specified in the own
resources decision);
- multi annual budget forecasts wi II be adopted present ing a regu lar and
smooth development of expenditure over time and leaving a margin of
security within the cei ling for the end of the period;
- budgetary discipline wi II be expressed in terms of appropriations for
commitments.
- the rate of increase for non-compulsory expenditure, in both
commitments and payments, will be determined at the beginning of the
budgetary procedure in an agreement between the three institutions;
- the maximum rate of increase wi II continue to apply to non-compulsory
expenditure, with the exception of that connected with the
implementation of the Single Act.
This interinstitutional agreement between Parliament Counci l and
Commission could take the form of a joint declaration specifying the
formal undertakings to which the three institutions wi II subscribe unti 
1992.
In due course the Commission wi II be presenting a draft that wi II be
final ;Zed in the "Trialogue" established by the Joint Declaration of
30 June 1982 (1).
~- -- -- ---- - -- - ---- - ---- -- ---
(1) See point III (5) of the Joint Declaration of 30 June 1982 (OJ C 194,
28. 1982).-32-
In order to set UP the new system advocated for own resources and to
introduce the planned innovations (dropping of the 10 % refund of
traditional own resources, assignment of customs duties on ECSC
products 1 % l~vy on VAT base, appl i.cation of additional base,
determination of gradual annual thresholds for taking up resources from
1988 to 1992, reference to the .ceiling of 1.4 % of GNP, etc...
), 
two
sets of instruments wi II hav~ to be revised
a) the basic Deci.sion (1) on the own resources system (based on Article
201 EEC) wi II have to be amended as appropriate. The procedure laid
down will involve ratification in the Member States
b) the implementing regulations (2) (based on Article 209 EEC) will have
to redrafted in line wi th the changes to the bas i c system.
The procedure for revising these instruments will require consultation
of the Court of Auditors and Pad lament and conci l i ation with
Pad i a,!,ent.
Once the basic Decision has been revised to incorporate these new
elements, the rules for applying the new system wi II be as follows
- any change in the 1 % levy rate on the actual base will requi re a
unanimous decision by the counci l after Pad iament has been
consulted;
the call-in rate to be applied to the additional base wi II 
determined during the budgetary procedure;
the creation of a new resource wi II require a unanimous decision by
the Council, to be confirmed by national procedure if necessary.
Parl iament should also be consulted.
4 The new rigour that the Commission is recommending for the preparation
and execution of the budget wi l'. entail a series of changes at two
levels:
a) Revision of the general Financial Regulation (3)
Il will be necessary to amend the provisions relating to the
principle of annual ity (changes in the rules concerning
appropriations remaining and carryovers), to draft new provisions
concern i ng reserves, adj ust the provi s ions concerni ng the EAGGF
Guarantee Section to replace advances by repayments, etc.
- - ----- - -------- --------- ----
(1) Council Decision of 7 Mai 1985 (OJ L 128, 14. 1985).
(2) Reg. 2891/77 of 19 December 1977 (OJ L 336, 27.12.1977),
Reg. 2892/77 of 19 December 1977 (OJ L 336, 27.12. 1977). This has already
been amended a number of times.
(3) Financial Regulation of 21 December 1977 (OJ L 356, 31.12. 1977) , for which
a proposal for general revision was made on  March 1984 (OJ C 97
1984) .-33-
This revision, based on Article 209 EEC, will require consultation of the Court of Auditors and Parliament and conci l iation with
Parl iament.
b) Revision of sectoral instruments
Stricter application of the principle of annual ity wi II mean
eliminating certain sectorial provisions which allow commitment
appropriations to be "reborn , virtually without any limit in time,
when commitments are cancelled. These provisions are to be found in 
- the ERDF (1)
- certain EAGGF Guidance relations (2).
The revision procedure wi II be as laid down in each of these
regulations.
------ - - ---- ---- -- - -------- --- ----
(1) Reg. 1787/84 of 19 June 1984 (OJ L 169, 28. 1984).
(2) Notab ly:
Reg. 355/77 of
Reg. 1760/78 of
Reg. 1941/81 of
Reg. 1938/81 of
15 February 1977 (OJ L 51 , 23. 1977)
25 July 1978 (OJ L 205, 28. 1978)
30 June 1981 (OJ l 197, 20. 1981)
30 June 1981 (OJ L 197, 20. 1981)-34-
v. ~~d9€tary imbalances
1 The COmmi$S10n would point Gut that the balance between Community budget
expenditur0 in a given Memb~r State and this Member State s contribution
to the financing of the Community can in no way be taken as a yardstick of
the overall bE'flefit or even the budgetary benefit which it derives from
Commnity m~mbership.
Th~ agreement reached at the Fontainebleau European Counci l in 1984
referred, however, to the concept of a budgetary burden which is excessive
in relatior, to the relative prosperity of certain Member States. It also
i?;d~)ptf'.d a system designed to provide compensation to the United Kingdom
and at the same time restrict Germany s contribution to the financing of
th i s compensat i on.
Th~ Europe~n Council also expressly stated that expenditure policy should
ul timately be the means of resolving the problem of budgetary imbalances.
2 The Commission proposes that the Fontainebleau mechanism be adjusted to
address essentially what is really at the root of the UK budgetary
problem, i.e. the relatively small volume of Community agricultural
expenditure in the United Kingdom.
Thi s wi II have three consequences:
- traditional own resources are no longer taken into account
mechanism~ as befits their genuinely Community nature;
in the
.- the planned growth of expenditure on economic and social cohesion and
that on new pol ides is intended to have a more direct influence on the
United Kingdom position; this corresponds to the option taken at
Fontai neb leau;
- as the plan is for the proportion of common agricultural policy
guarantee expenditure to deminish , the mech.anism wi II gradually apply to
sma lle I' amount s .
3 On this basis it would be agreed that the size of the British budgetary
problem would be measured by comparing the UK' s share of Community GNP
with its share of EAGGF Guarantee expenditure. The difference would be
appl ied to total EAGGF Guarantee expenditure.
The compensation to the United Kingdom would be defined as being equal to
half of the result of this calculation.
4 To allow for the relative prosperity of the countries making up  the
Community today and the net budgetary burden already borne by Germany, the
arrangements for financing this compensation would be as follows:
- the less-prosperous countries (Greece,
would not have to contribute;
Ireland Portugal and Spain)
- Germany would contribute 25% of its normal share;
the  remainder would be contributed by the other countries in proportion
to their relative wealth (shares based on GNP corrected by per capita
GNP.-35-
Table 11 below gives estimated figures for 1987.
Table 11 : Compensation model for EAGGF balances
1987
--- - - - - - -- - - - - -  -- - - ---- -- -- - --- - ----- ------ - - - - -- --- - --- - -- - -- --- ------- - ---- -- ----- ---
Share in
EAGGF
(1)
Share in
GNP
(2)
Net ba lance
(1-2) xEAGGF
MECU (3)
Per capi ta
GDP in PPA
(4)
financing
scale (2)
(5)
Compensaf ions
(6)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
')8 103,
118
26, 119, 13, 141
55,
20, 109, 39, 405
IRL 67,
93, 25, 261
140
108
17, 032 (3) 107, 016(1)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EUR 12 100 100 100 100
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) 50% reimbursement
(2) GNP shares corrected by per capita GDP (for Germany 25 % of its normal
share)
(3) Calculated on the basis of an EAGGF Guarantee total of 25 780 million ECU
as shown in the five-year financial perspective.
5 The mechanism proposed above would apparently give satisfactory results -
when allowance is also made for the effects of the new own resources
system - both for the United Kingdom and for Germany. However, as it may
be influenced by budget variables, provision should be made for verifying
its operat i on and consequences after, say, two or th ree years.
6 This compensation could be entered in a new Chapter 84 in Title 8 of the
expenditure side of the budget. The amount of compensation for the United
Kingdom would be entered as expenditure and would be offset by negative
expenditure for the other Member States corresponding to their shares in
the financing.
Since the net result of this operation is nil
made on the revenue side.
no entry would have to be-36-
PART THREE: FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE 1988-1992
INTRODUCTION AND MAIN CONCLUSIONS
Present prel iminary Financial Perspectives for 1988-1992
- accompany ;:Ind iLLustrate Commission s documents on new own resources,
on CAP and Reform of Structural Funds
- expound Commission s proposal for medium range development in the light
of the Single Act taking account of European Parliament I S Resolution on
Future Financing of the Community (23.10.86) ;
- constitute the basis for a major innovation in pluriannual forecasting: the
Counci l ;:Ind the European Parliament  are  invited to discuss these Perspectives
with the aim of agreeing on a common pluriannual reference framework.
Financial Perspectives would thus be transformed from a Commission
policy proposal into an inter-institutional pluriannual planning document
- a planning document which would reflect development of the Cofl'ffiunity
;:Ind budgetary discipline;
- serve as a framework for the 1988 budget proposals (as initially foreseen
in the Council' s 21 April 1970 decision on pluriannual financial fore-
casts 1)
Figures for the 1988-1992 Perspectives are presented using constvnt 1987 prices
and exchange rates.
Major conc Lus ions may be resumed as foLLows. EAGGF-Guarantee expen-
diture deveLoping within the Limits of the GuideL ine principLe, doubt ing
of structuraL Funds appropriations in reaL terms , promoting research and
other indispensabLe Community poLicies , budgeting the 7th European Develop-
ment Fund in 1990/91, providing for new PoLicies and correction of budgetary
imbalances is LiabLe to produce an increase in necEssary appropriations
for commitments of 5, 8 % pe  year in reaL terms.
The budget structure wi II thus evolve towards a situation where EAGGF
Guarantee expenditure represents scarcely more than 50 %, where StructuraL
interventions account for 25 % and research for 3 % of totaL appropriations.
1) OJ L 94 , 28. 1970.-37-
TABLE .LEXPENOITURE 1987-1992 - API'KIIF'RIATIONS FOR COIIIIITIIENTS
1 987 PRICES
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
1, EAGGF /~lJarantee
60. 58. 57. 55. 53. 51.5
Other intervention policies
22. 24. 29. 32. 36. 38.
3. ReflJnds and administration
17. 16. 13. 11.7 10.
4. TOTAL
100. 100. 100. 100. 100. 100.
in 
The necessary appropriations for payments will grow by 4
8 % per year on average, reaching a total of approximately, 52.700 mi II ion ECU in 1992 (at 1987 prices). 
A "constant resources policy" extrapolation shows that resources within the
present limits of 1 4 % VAT would cover only three quarters of 1992 needs
New resources within 1 4 % of the Gros$ National Product would 
seem. both necessary and suffi c ient : Estimated needs correspond to a GNP rate of
28 %; the remaining unused resources would represent roughly 9 % of the
1992 budget whi ch may be cons idered as an acceptable margin of security.
The indi cated GNP rate shows that the share of the Community budget (P . in Gross National' Product would only 
raise from about 1 2 % in 1987 to roughly 3 % in 1992.
TABLE 2: E:~DenditIJI'e and 1'!!SOIJrces 1987-1992  Million ECU
AVERAGE
AT 1987 PRICES
GROWTH RATE
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1992/1987
1. Appropriations 42910 44970 47420 49920 53060 56740 for Colluai tments
2. Appropriations 41740 43360 45370 47110 ~%4f1 ! 52710 fOl' payments
- I 3. 1 % GNP 36100 37060 38050 39060 40100 Hi 70 
4. ResolJrces
wi thin 50550 51900 53250 54700 56150 57650 1.4 % GNP
5. GNP rate in % 1.16 1.17 1.19 1.21 1.24 1.28 (2)  : m
6. Margin (4)-(2) 8810 8540 7880 7590 6510 4940~o-
I . GENERAL ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK
1 ~ In accordance with the approach adopted in the document on New Own
resources, a five year. horizon - 1992 - has been chosen for the new
Financial Perspective.
In 1992
- the internal market should have been completed,
- the transitional period for Spain and Portugal will have ended in
the main areas,
- several of the present major Community programmes will be completed
(framework research programme, five-year allocation for EAGGF-Guidance,
EDF, IMPs).
2. Policy development proposed is formulated in terms of appropriations for
commitments, and budgetary discipline is also mainly considered in terms
of commitments : payments are, essentially, a technical consequence of
commitments and payment schemes.
3. Since inflation rates have substantially decreased during the last few years
comparisons between future and past developments in monetary terms would be
misleading.
Detai led  estimates are therefore presented at  constant (1987) pr; ces
4. 1987 figures shown in tables are, in most cases , those resulting from Counci l
of Minister s second reading (27.11.86). Resources estimates are updated.
Figures for 1988  are  provisional. Resources estimates take account of
discussions in the Advisory Committee on Own Resources 1 meeting of 23 January.
Expenditure estimates are based on expected real expenditure in 1987 
(EAGGF-Guarantee) . 
5. Table 3 shows the expected trend in GNP, prices and estimates for the
maximum rate of increase " concerning non compulsory expenditure.
TABLE 3 : General economic framework and maximum rate of increase for
non-compulsory expenditure (EUR-12) 1987-1992. Rate of in-
crease in %
1992 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
..6t.I2
VoLume
Prices
Va Lue
MAXIMUM RATE
VaLue
VoLume-39.-
II.  EXPENDITURE 1988-1992
Over the pLanning period of five years envisaged, the structure of the budget
wi II necessari Ly be the object of some fundamental changes. The effect of the
previous year s unsolved problems , such as depreciation of agricultural stocks
coverage of budget deficits and dealing with the cost of the past, will una-
voidably absorb a significant part of new own resources in the first years of
the planning period. Gradually, however, increased headroom will be developed
which will allow the Community to fulfill the political intentions it has
undertaken , especially through the adoption of the new policies included in
the Single European Act.
Main lines proposed are
- limitation of EAGGF-Guarantee expenditure,
- reform of the structural Funds , combined with
in real terms,
-implementation of the proposed Rese.arch Framework Programme,
- development of other and new poL ides , including environment
- maintaining the Community GNP share spent through the budget in favour of
development cooperation, and budgeting the 7th European Development Fund.
a doubling of expenditure CC.
II. 1-  TOTAL EXPENDITURE
According to estimates detailed in following sections,  total appropriations
for commitments would have to increase by 5 8 % per year. This growth
rate would be suffi dent to cover development of pol ides , correction of
budgetary imbalances and a specific provision for new policies 
Table 4
The  budget structure wou ld evolve towards a reduced share for
EAGGF-Guarantee expenditure and increased relative importance of
Structural funds and Research expenditure; due to budget ing the 7th EDF
it would also reflect more clearly the total Community effort in
Development cooperat ion.
2 EXPENDITURE BY SECTOR
1. EAGGF
a)  Pol i cy outl ine
Agricultural policy for the coming years will reflect the necessity
to adjust CAP to the change in the general economic context and to
tbenew market situation while at the same time safeguarding prin-
ciples which are its base.
This wiLL mean
- bringing total Guarantee expenditure under control, by following
the "guideLine" principle according to which expenditure growth
should remain within the limits of resources growth. "Automati c
stabi l ;zers" would neutral ;ze additional expenditure;
- restructuring and rational izing CAP expenditure : Encouragement
of structural adjustments, concentration of measures.-40-
TrlPH , ,OI'llluIlllkf 1987 199;' 1iI'f'~Of'RIATlOH5 fOR rOdKIIKINI'
"\.0 WI
~-- -"~-'-
~r----
~--, ----~
I Aver"~e ~ro
~;--
A T 1 987 f'R 1 C E S
r;te in 
1988 191W 1990 1991 1992 1992/1987 198i, 1987
1. EAr.Gf GIHr;ntee 25780 261,20 27090 2mO 28490 29210
2. StrlJd'Jr;l inte,,'entions 7230 7t,t,0 9~60 10860 I m50 11,290 1~.
3, Other polides 2600 2990 3~90 3750 ~~70 5010
1,.  Refun4s .n4 ;4.inistr;tion 7300 7620 6280 58~0 51,50 5t,J0 -5.
II.w polki.. 500 1100 1700 2200 2800
6 ,TOTAL  ~2910 4mO m20 49920 531160 56740
';,'
owth rot. in 
TABLE 5 ,  EXf'ENDITURE  1987-1992 - APf' ROPFIATlOHS fOR PAYKEIITS
/110 ECU
A T 1987 PRICES Aven9. 1rovtt,
rote in X
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1992/1987
1. EAG,;r ;;'H,'.nt.. 25780 26420 27090 2mO 28490 29210
2, Strudunl interventions 6210 6540 8190 I 9170 10~30 11630 13.
3, Oth.r polkles 24501 2580 3210 I 3330 3770 4340
~. Relunds OM .dlinistntion 7300 7620 6280 5840 5450 3430 -1.
N..  polid.s 200 600 1000 1500 2100
6. TOTAL ~3300 45370 47110 ~9640 12710' 41740 I
Growth r,t. ir,
Notes:
Sector (2) "Structural interventions = Structural Funds + Fisheries
(3) "Other policies " = Research, other internal intervention policies
+ Deve lopment Cooperat i on.
(4) "Refunds and Administration" = Refunds to Member States , Correction of budgetary imbalances + Administrative expenditure.-41-
EAGGF-Guarantee expenditure
The provisions made for EAGGF-Guarantee expenditure over the period 1988-92
are in accordance with the budgetary discipl ine principle that the cost of
market intervention as defined in 1984 should not grow more rapidly than
Own resources. The base for expenditure was probable real spending in 1987,
excluding costs carried ov.er from  1'186  - i.e. a figure 2800 mi II ion ECU
higher than the Preliminary Draft Budget estimate . The expenditure limits -
re~ultjng from the application of budgetary discipLine are given in table 6. 
- -
It is worth noting that expenditure wi II be incurred during the period
1988-1992 on the physical disposal of intervention stocks in public
storage, or on writing-down their book value to reflect their true market
value. The corresponding co.st is likely to be of the order of 5 to 6
billion ECU (after allowing for savings on storage costs) , depending on
the disposal options chosen and thei r timing. This cost wi II have to be
met within the limits imposed by budgetary discipline.
It must be underlined that the expenditure provisions for 1988-1992
are based on two essential premisses:
- that the guidel ine principle is applied to real expenditure in 1987
and
that 1987 expenditure is financed 100 % in 1987, i.e. that no 1987
costs are carried over to following years.
TABLE 6:  EAGGF-Guarantee expenditure 1987-1992 (at 1987 pri ces) in mi llion ECU
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Net expenditure 23.629 24. 243 24.905 25. 566 26. 275 26. 984
(revised guide-
line)
Sugar levies 2. 154 2. 180 2. 189 202 215 230
food aid and
ACP refunds
TOTAL 25. 783 26. 423 27.094 27. 768 28. 490 29. 214
rounded 25 .780 26.420 27.090 27.770 28.490 29.210
Growth rate
During 1988-1992, EAGGF expenditure growth would thus be limited to about 2
per year....,-
2. FISHERIES AND THE SEA
Accession of Spain and Portugal brought a doubling of
the number of fishermen and a 75 % increase in flshing capacity.
Perspectives for 1988-1992 i~ply
a) a growth of expenditure for market organizations, for fishing agreements
and research corresponding roughly to the rate of increase of GNP
e.  of the proposed new base of own resources
b) implementation of the new 1987-1997 structural plan adopted by the Coun-
cil on  17/18.12. 1986.  In particular, this plan envisages establishment ofa viable fishing fleet , adjustment of supply to demand, and alLe-
viation of social consequences of change. Financing would comprise
EIB loans and General budget allocations; for the fi rst five years,
the Council agreed on a 800 Mio ECU budget envelope (including EAGGF
Guidance expenditure).
Budget commitments in constant pri ces are supposed to increase
gradually from roughly 140 million ECU in 1988 to 200 million ECU in
1992 , payments following with a lag of about two years.
3. PROMOTING COHESION : THE STRUCTURAL FUNDS
a)  Policy outline 
Reform proposals elaborated by the Commission in implementation of
the terms of reference of the Single Act (Article 130 D) encompass
the following principles
10 Independent action by the Community, using the structural Funds
and thE financial instruments , must add effectiveness to national
measures.
20 The Commission must ensure the coherence of national and Community
measures -
30 The Funds wi II concentrate on four priority problems: underdeveloped
regions, industrial decline , long-term youth unemployment, and
agriculture.
40 Fund assistance will for the most part be organized in the form
of programmes, allowing decentral i zation, real ex-ante socio-
economic assessment, and a genuine check on effectiveness.
Joint management of programmes by Community and Member States
following these lines will make it easier to cancel appropria-
t ions when e xped i ent .
50 In the steps it takes to assist structurally underdeveloped regions
the Commission will seek to promote the mobilization of the national,
regional and local resources avai lable.
The bulk of Regional Fund assistance and almost half of the resources
of the SociaL Fund will be alLocated to these regions.-43-
60 Certain measures currently financed by the EAGGF-Guidance Section
such as drainage or rural infrastructure projects, should now be
dealt with solely by the Regional Fund or the Community loan
facilities.
b)  Expenditure forecasts
Taking account of the crucial role of Structural Funds
Commission proposes a doubl ing of real expenditure for
1992 (Commitment appropriations)..
for cohesion
the Funds unt 
Forecasts are based on the following hypotheses concerning imple-
mentation of this overall principle:
Pending reform of the funds, 1988 commitments would increase by 3 %
in real terms. This rate is very close to what was envisaged in last
year s " Financial Perspective 1987-1990" for the Social Fund (roughly
3 %) and the Regional Fund (about 2 % at constant pri ces) .
After the reform, Commission and Fund benefi ciaries wi II be able to
manage and absorb substanti ally increased ai d. In order to compensate for
the very' modest increase in 1988 and still achieve doubling within five
years, it is proposed to make a particular financial effort in 1989
(+ 28 %). Growth rates in subsequent years would be about 1S % per year.
4. RESEARCH
Arti cle 130 I (EEC) introduced by the Single Act provides that
If 1. The Community shall adopt a multiannual framework programme setting
out all its activities. The framework programme shall lay down the
scientifi c and technical objectives, define their respective priori-
ties, set out the main lines of the activities envisaged and fix the
amount deemed necessary, the detailed rules for financial participa-
tion by the Community in the programme as .a whole and the breakdown
of this amount between the various activities envisaged.
2. The framework programme may be adapted or supplemented, as the
situation changes.
Forecasts reflect the Commission s Framework proposal for 1987-1991
(7735 miLLions in current prices). This proposal gives particular weight
to information technologies, energy and application of new technologies
in industry, telecommunications and quality of life.
1992 is supposed to be a transition year with a somewhat lower level
of appropri at i ons.-44-
5. OTHER INTERNAL INTERVENTION POLICIES
Appropriations for all other internal intervention policies such as the
envi ronmenta l poli cy, Medi terranean programmes, transport, energy and
industry, have been grouped together under this heading.
Corresponding total commitments (and payments) are supposed to
grow by approximately the maximum rate for non compulsory expenditure.
Development of new activities linked to implementation of the Single
Act may draw on the provision made for new policies (point 9).
6. DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION
Almost 50 '% of General Budget appropriations for Development concern food aid.
Estimates are based on the hypotheses that
- the relation between Community (including EDF) and national development
effort will essentially remain unchanged,
- the share of Community budget commitments in GNP remains constant,
- corresponding to intention of' Commission and repeated requests of
European Parl iament , the European Development Fund wi II become part
of the General Budget.
Figures imply budgeting the next (7th) EDF. This item explains a sharp
increase of appropr1ations in 1991-1992.
Since factual expenditure wi II depend on negotiations with countries
concerned, the figures proposed must be considered as very provisional
estimates.
7. RFFUNDS TO MEMBER STATES
Figures under this heading cover essentially
a) from 1987 to 1991 : An estimate of reimbursements in favour of Spain
and Portugal according to Articles 187 and 374 of the Accession Treaty - a
decreasing part of VAT and complementary contributions
1987 : 70 '% ; 1988 : 55 % ; 1989 : 40 
%; 
1990 : 25 % ; 1991 : 5 % ;
b) from 1987 to 1989 : a 250 mi II ion ECU per year reimbursement of
advances paid by Member Countries in 1984 ;
(In conformity with the Commission s proposal on own resources , it is
supposed that the 10 % refund of customs duties, agri cultural and sugar
Levies wi l l be abrogated).
8. ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE
Expected growth of administrative expenditure (all Institutions) reflects
a very modest increase in real terms of about 1 % per year on average.-45-
HEW  POLICIES
Additional appropriations have been earmarked for new policies. These may be
intrinaicdly new or they may simply be a strengthening of cerUin specific
aspects of existing policies, Two areas should be taken into account:
(a) The completion of the internal market wilL inevitably engender new
expenditure. If the main objective of a better allocation of factors of
production is attained, the result should of course be more vigorous
growth and .a better employment situation. But another effect could also
be a loss or a slackening in cohesion (social and regional aspects of
the completion of the internal market), in that an improved allocation
of factors generally causes 8 certain shift towards the more dynamic
regions. Some of the additional r.esourcU which wi II be generated by
the higher macroeconomic growth rate should therefore be assigned to the
Community budget so that it will be possible to attain the objectives of
the Single Act as regards cohesion by restoring the balance between the
regions in the allocation of the positive effect! of growth that should
be produced.
(b) The transnational nature of environment problems will call for Community action. This will mainly take the form of rl':gulations.  The
di stribution between Member States of the cost of these regulations wi 
probably not be the same as the distribution of the benefits. It 
therefore natural that. the Community should introduce appropriate
po l i c1 e!) to ach i eve a better match between the costs and benefits of
su~h an environment policy.
The figure of 5% of commitment appropriations earmarked i.n 1992 for new
policies should give the Community institutions the necessary
'flexibility to provide an appropriate reSponse to the probLems set.-46-
10. CORRECTION OF BUDGETARY IMBALANCES
Estimates given (and expressed in terms of thei r expenditure equivalent)
a~e necessari ly very provisional, they do not prejudge a decision on the
correction mechanism to be adopted.
I I I. RESOUR CES FOR 1988-1992
Table 7 shows 1988-1992 forecasts. a) Part J of the table gives re.ults of a "constant policy
forecast" : Evolution of existing own resources within the limits
of 1 4 1 of VAT.
The basis of the forecast is a provisional revision of the 1987 own
resources. The figures for 198a are, in current prices , exactly those
adopted by the ACOR (Advisory Committee on Own Resources) at its 23 January
1987 meeting. They are therefore provisional. The final figures should
be fixed at the ACOR meeting at the end of Apri l to be entered in the
Prel imi nary Draft Budget for 1988.
Customs duties and the total of agricultural and sugar levies
are liable to decrease at constant prices. Estimates concerning customs
duties ,take account of a further reduction in tariffs as a consequence
of the Uruguay-Round and of progressive integration of Spain and Portugal.
Estimates concerning agricultural levies envisage a reduction of EUR-10
cereals imports , they take account of the fact that from 1991,Portugal will have
to pay in all agricultural levies. Average growth of VAT receipts corresponds
to the growth rate of GNP; the 1989 figure takes account of Portugal'
changing to VAT.
The total of resources with.in the present limit of 1 '1. VAT
increases by about  '1. per year, i. e. a bit more than a third of the rate
of growth of (NP. Constant policy resources would thus reach about
39. 700 million ECU in 1992 - an amount which would cover only 75 
of needs in terms of appropri ations for payments.
b) Part II of the table gives extrapolations of 1987 figures under the
following theoretical ~onditions :
1 a tot a l avai lable resources 1988-1992 are a constant percentage of GNP;
2" a constant GNP percentage equal to
- ei ther the factual own resources/G~P relation in 1987 - case of
line II. a. By definition, resources thus obtained for 1987 correspond
to resources within the limit of 1 4 ,; VAT. In later years , resources
growth equals growth of GNP. The 1992 result is 43. 110 million ECU - i.
roughly 9 j, more than the " constant policy" figure. In other terms
the fact that present own resources grow less than GNP costs about
9 ~ of resources in 1992 -47-
- or the factual expenditure/GNP relation in 1987 (roughly 1,2 'I.) -
case of tine II.b. In this case, the 1992 result lies about 25 'I.
above the "constant poti cy figure , but it is not suffi cient to
cover 1992 expendi ture needs.
c) Part III. shows evolution of resources within the 1, 'Z. GNP limit
proposed. The corresponding estimate for 1992 is 57650 mi II ion ECU.
Comparison with evaluation of expenditure shows that with the
4 'I. GNP limit
- 1992 appropriations for commitments would repr.esent 98 'I. of resources,
- 1992 appropriations for  payments would consume some 91 'Z. of resources
(- 1,28 'I. of GNP), leaving an unused margin of 9 'I. or roughly 5000 million
ECU.
TABLE 7 : Evolution of Own resources 1987-1992 - MILLION ECU
Aver"'1e
1986 198 7 prices growth
rote in 
1987 1988 1989 1998 1991 1992
1. Conshnt
policy
Forec..t
I. CtJStOls
4uties 8661 8994 8738 8447 8153 7848 -2.
2. Agric~l-
tur~1 and
s~gar
levies 2'195 2751 2713 2824 2785 -t.4
3. t.4%  VAT 25851 25936 26692 27328 28032 28753
4. Hi.cella-
neoos 274 279 285 2'18 2'16 302
5. rotal
within 37781 38000 38458 38778 39305 39680 1.0
1.4% VAT
- rounded 37780 38000 38460 38780 39310 39680 1.0
- grOllth
rate% 1.4
IUIIP ti.it
alroughly
ec",liva-
lent to
1987 37800 38810 39820 40910 41990 43110
resOlll'-
ces:
1.0m
b)eq~iv....
lent to
1987 ex. 43330 444911 45640 46890 48138 49418
pendit~-
re CI2X1
III.Proposed
1.4%
GIll' Ii.it 58558 51900 53258 54700 56150 57650
(rD'Jnded)
- growth
rate % 2.7